La théorie patočkienne des trois mouvements de l’existence humaine et la question de l’affectivité

Abstract

One of the major innovations introduced by Patočka into the conceptual landscape of phenomenology consists in the theory of the three movements of human existence, through which he seeks to provide a fresh understanding of subjectivity. In the context of elaborating this doctrine, he proposes a new elucidation of the status of affectivity. Indeed, insofar as each movement represents a modulation of the openness to the world specific to existence, and insofar as every manifestation of human life is imbued with an affective atmosphere, the distinction between the three movements of existence seems to provide the guiding thread for systematically mapping the domain of affectivity. However, in most of his developments on this question, Patočka limits the scope of affectivity to the sphere of the first movement of existence. My approach will be guided by two questions. First, I wish to elucidate the reasons that led Patočka to advance such a description of affectivity and to establish an intimate link between the affective sphere and the process of anchoring in the world characteristic of the first movement. Secondly, I will examine whether the scope of affective life extends beyond this relationship of connivance or belonging to the world and, in particular, I will scrutinize the possibility of detecting figures or variations of affectivity that determine the second and third movements of existence.